Probabilities are long-run relative frequencies for the collective, rather than an individual. Probabilities do not apply to theories, as individual theories are not collectives. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be assigned a probability. A p-value does not indicate the probability of the null hypothesis being true. Power or a p-value is not necessary in Bayesian statistics, as a degree of plausibility can be assigned to theories and the data tells us how to adjust these plausibilities. It is only needed to determine a factor by which we should change the probability of different theories given the data. The probability of a hypothesis being true is the prior probability (P(H)). The probability of a hypothesis given the data is the posterior probability (P(H|D)). The probability of obtaining the exact data given the hypothesis is the likelihood (P(D|H)). Therefore, the posterior probability is the likelihood times the prior probability. The likelihood principle states that all information relevant to inference contained in data is provided by the likelihood. In a distribution, the p-value is the area under the curve at a certain point. The likelihood is the height of the distribution at a certain point. The p-value is influenced by the stopping rule (1), whether or not the test is post-hoc (2) and how many other tests have been conducted (3). These things do not influence the likelihood. The Bayes factor is the ratio of the likelihoods. The Bayes factor is driven to 0 if the null hypothesis is true, whereas the p-values fluctuate randomly if the null hypothesis is true and data-collection continues. The Bayes factor is slowly driven towards the ‘truth’. Therefore, the Bayes factor gives a notion of sensitivity. It distinguishes evidence that there is no relevant effect from no evidence of a relevant effect. It can be used to determine the practical significance of an effect. Adjusting conclusions according to when the hypothesis was...