IBP Psychology and Science

Chapter 1:  Science as knowledge derived from the facts of experience

Science: to be based on what we can see, hear and touch rather than on personal opinions or speculative imaginings.

• If observation of the world is carried out in a careful, unprejudiced way then the facts established in this way will constitute a secure, objective basis for science.
• If, further, the reasoning that takes us from this factual basis to the laws and theories that constitute scientific knowledge is sound, then the resulting knowledge can itself be taken to be securely established and objective.

Empiricism and positivism share the common view that scientific knowledge should in some way be derived from the facts arrived at by observation:

• The British empiricists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, notably John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume, held that all knowledge should be derived from ideas implanted in the mind by way of sense perception.
• The positivists had a somewhat broader and less psychologically orientated view of what facts amount to, but shared the view of the empiricists that knowledge should be derived from the facts of experience.

Three components of the stand on the facts assumed to be the basis of science in the common view can be distinguished. They are:

(a) Facts are directly given to careful, unprejudiced observers via the senses.

(b) Facts are prior to and independent of theory.

(c) Facts constitute a firm and reliable foundation for scientific knowledge

“Scientific knowledge has a special status in part because it is founded on a secure basis, solid facts firmly established by observation”

• Difficulties with this statement:
  • One difficulty concerns the extent to which perceptions are influenced by the background and expectations of the observer, so that what appears to be an observable fact for one need not be for another.
  • The second source of difficulty stems from the extent to which judgments about the truth of observation statements depend on what is already known or assumed, thus rendering the observable facts as fallible as the presuppositions underlying them.
  • Both kinds of difficulty suggest that maybe the observable basis for science is not as straightforward and secure as is widely and traditionally supposed.

Resources:

What is This Thing Called Science 4^th Edition (CHALMERS)