Historical and Conceptual Issues in Psychology by M. Brysbaert and K. Rastle (second edition) – Summary chapter 7
The mind refers to the faculties humans and animals have to perceive, feel, think, remember and want. Consciousness refers to the self-perception and the explicit experiences a person has of the world around them. There are two mutually exclusive stances in the mind-body debate:MonismThis stance holds that there is only one kind of thing and this can be subdivided in materialism (1) and idealism (2).DualismThis stance holds that there are two kinds of things and this can be subdivided in substance-dualism (1) and property dualism (2).Property dualism states that there is not an autonomous mental substance but that there are autonomous mental properties. Materialism states that everything is material. Idealism states that everything is mental. Descartes proposed that the body was a machine (1), introduced the mind-body problem (2) and introduced the mind as causal director of the body (3). There are three major issues with substance-dualism:Interaction problemThis is the problem of how a non-material entity can influence a material entity.Causal closure problem (e.g. law of conservation of energy)This is the problem of how the immaterial mind can be a cause if every physical event has a physical cause. Brain damage (i.e. damage to the material brain influences the mind) This is the problem of how a material entity can influence a non-material entity. Dualism is not used often in scientific circles. According to the materialists, the mind is matter and follows the laws of nature, although tie concept matter is flexible (e.g. fields, states, processes). Materialism has several issues:Problem of qualia (e.g. Nagel)This is the problem of whether and how subjective experience can exist if everything is matter. Identity problem (i.e. two different encodings, same experience)This is the problem of explaining how two events can be experienced the same if their encodings differ. Problem of simulation (e.g. simulation attempts have...
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